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Inducing Breach of Contract, Conversion and Contract as Property 
Pey-Woan Lee 
 




This article seeks to understand contractual rights through an examination of the possible ‘property’ 
content in contracts in the context of the inducement tort and conversion. It argues that, contrary to 
popular perception, contracts and property are different shades of a similar phenomenon. Not being a 
reified ‘thing’ with stable features and structure, property is a relative rather than an absolute concept. 
To determine whether the holder of an intangible resource ought to be conferred with ‘property’ or 
exclusive control of access to such resource, one has to evaluate the relevant practical, legal and moral 
considerations. Applied to the context of inducing breach of contract and conversion, this analysis 
demonstrates that a contractual right is in fact a composite collection of distinct interests and each tort 
may be protective of one or more of such interests. Thus, liability is imposed for inducing breach of 
contract because tort law recognizes the promisee's exclusive right to the peremptory status of the 
promisor's promise. On the other hand, the wrongfulness of converting a contract lies in the usurpation 
of a contracting party's control, or the exclusive entitlement to decide whether and how to exercise her 




The decision of the House of Lords in OBG Ltd v Allan1 is likely to be the subject of lively debate for 
a long time to come. In a move applauded by commentators2 for giving structure and clarity to the 
hitherto confounding topic of economic torts, their Lordships drew a bright line between the classic tort 
of inducing a breach of contract and the tort of causing loss by unlawful means, emphasizing the distinct 
rationales underlying the two torts. By a narrow majority, their Lordships also adhered to orthodoxy in 
confining the tort of conversion to chattels, refusing to extend its application to intangibles such as 
contractual rights.3 The examination of these two torts raises an important question: to what extent and 
on what basis ought the law of tort to be invoked to protect contractual interests? A satisfactory answer 
can only be found, it is submitted, in first elucidating the nature of contractual interests. 
Of the diverse observations raised in their Lordship's reasoning, the conception of contractual rights as 
some form of ‘property’ stands out in both the context of inducing breach of contract and of conversion. 
Specifically, Lord Hoffmann explained4 the rationale of the Lumley v Gye5 tort as follows:  
It treats contractual rights as a species of property which deserve special protection, not only by giving 
a right of action against the party who breaks his contract but by imposing secondary liability on a 
person who procures him to do so. 
Notwithstanding this appeal to property in justifying the inducement tort, a majority of the Law Lords 
were not moved by the same idea to extend conversion liability to contractual interests. In this latter 
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context, Lord Hoffmann was anxious to distinguish contracts from chattels, emphasizing the traditional 
role of the tort in safeguarding (only) the latter. Instead, contractual loss is characterized as ‘pure 
economic loss’.6 The dissenting Law Lords, on the other hand, questioned the rationality of the 
distinction between chattels and contracts for the purposes of the tort when it is well-established that 
the tort applies to documentary intangibles. Baroness Hale, in particular, pointed to the ‘proprietary’ 
quality that inheres in both documentary choses in action and general contractual interests, and the 
indefensibility of applying the tort to one but not the other.7 What thus emerges from this debate is the 
endorsement of some limited conception of contracts as ‘property’ by both the majority and minority 
Law Lords, but it is far from clear whether they had in mind a common understanding of contract as 
property. In light of that, what, if any, is the analytical value of property analogies in these contexts? 
Or are they mere rhetoric purporting to legitimize pre-determined conclusions? From this perspective, 
the tort issues that arose in OBG v Allan are not just about torts, but are also about contracts. The various 
contentious tort issues serve, in fact, as an external lens through which a different perspective of the 
nature and function of contracts may be obtained. And, because tort law has traditionally assumed the 
important role of protecting persons and property, analogies with property appear both pertinent and 
unavoidable. 
This article seeks, therefore, to extract fresh perspectives on contractual rights through an examination 
of the possible ‘property’ content in contracts in the context of the inducement tort and conversion. It 
takes the view that, contrary to common perception, contracts and property are better seen as different 
shades of a similar phenomenon. In particular, property does not exist as a reified ‘thing’ with stable 
features and structure; it is a relative rather than an absolute concept. At its core, property may be 
understood as a state-endorsed power relation that regulates access to valuable resources. To qualify for 
such protection, a resource must minimally be capable of being excluded from the rest of the world. 
The question whether intangibles are amenable to such exclusivity has to be determined by evaluating 
the relevant practical, legal and moral considerations. Applied to the context of inducing breach of 
contract and conversion, this produces an interesting result. That is, tort does not relate to contract as if 
it were a monolith. Instead, a contractual right is better seen as a composite collection of distinct 
interests and each tort may be protective of one or more of such interests. Thus, liability is imposed for 
inducing breach of contract because tort law recognizes the promisee's exclusive right to the peremptory 
status of the promisor's promise. The rationale of the tort thus rests essentially on a moral basis. On the 
other hand, if the conversion of contractual rights is permitted (and it is argued that it ought to be), then 
the critical interest is the exclusive control which a contracting party may legitimately expect to exercise 
over his contractual rights. The justification for such extension stems from the desirability of respecting 
a contracting party's exclusive entitlement to decide whether and how to exercise her rights under the 
contract. 
2. Contract as Property 
At common law, contract and property are usually conceived of as being diametrically opposed. If 
property is ‘represented by a continuum along which varying kinds of “property” status may shade 
finely into each other’,8 contractual rights are thought to lie at the far end of nil ‘propertiness’.9 A classic 
example of such an approach is found in the well-known dichotomy drawn by Wesley Hohfeld between 
rights in rem and rights in personam. According to Hohfeld, rights in rem are ‘multital rights’ that are 
good against persons of a large and indefinite class, while rights in personam are ‘paucital rights’ that 
apply against one or several determinate persons.10 Since a bilateral contract embodies obligations owed 
to determinate persons, it is the quintessential example of an in personam right. Notably, while Hohfeld 
does not insist on any intrinsic difference between in rem and in personam rights, the distinction is 
premised entirely on the scope of the respective rights.11 In other words, rights in rem and rights in 
personam are fundamentally of the same nature, differing only in the class of persons to whom they 
attach. This conception is crucial to a central tenet of Hohfeld's thesis, that is, all rights in rem apply to 
persons, not things, specifically tangible things.12 Because both in rem and in personam rights apply to 
persons, it is not possible, in Hohfeld's view, to distinguish between their intrinsic characters. For the 
same reason, it also follows that rights in rem do not always relate to tangible objects.13 Other than 
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tangible objects, rights in rem could exist even in intellectual property, bodily integrity, reputation and 
even privacy. The decisive factor is whether the right is of a nature that could be applied as against a 
wide and indefinite class of persons. So understood, Hohfeld's approach creates only a ‘weak’ 
distinction between property and contractual rights. Even though he cites the bilateral contract as the 
paradigm of in personam rights by way of contrast to in rem rights, the distinction breaks down once it 
is possible to conceive of the contractual right, or particular aspects of it, as being good against a broad 
and unlimited class of persons. The tort of inducing breach of contract appears to achieve this result by 
protecting a promisee's expectations from the interference of strangers, thus inspiring justificatory 
accounts premised on analogies between contract and property rights.14 
Hohfeld's exposition of property rights is also known to have precipitated the modern conception of 
property as a ‘bundle of rights’.15 This stems from his contention that land, the archetype of ‘property’, 
is in fact ‘a complex aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges, powers and immunities’.16 This means 
that property is not defined by a single legal relation, but a multiple of such relations with multiple 
persons and each of such relations exists independently of the others. Similarly, the bundle metaphor 
depicts property as a collection of distinct and independent legal relations.17 Being separable, the 
constituent relations of each bundle may be taken apart and recombined to constitute different bundles. 
No one bundle, however, constitutes the definitive mark of ‘property’ or ‘ownership’. So ‘property’ 
comprises not a singular coherent concept but a varying content contingent on the legal incidents that 
make up a particular bundle. But while the bundle metaphor frees the property notion from the 
constraints of traditional forms of property, it provides scant guidance for distinguishing property from 
other rights.18 
One way to fill this gap is found in Tony Honoré's standard incidents of ownership. In his seminal 
article, Honoré identifies these standard incidents as ‘the right to possess, the right to use, the right to 
manage, the right to income of the thing, the right to capital, the right to security [against expropriation], 
the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability 
execution, and the incident of residuarity’.19 For Honoré, these incidents constitute the ‘necessary 
ingredients’ of a liberal concept of ownership in a particular legal system, but a person may be 
designated as the ‘owner’ of a thing even if some of such incidents are absent.20 Applying these criteria, 
contractual rights may still be understood as property in a weak sense.21 A contractual chose in action, 
for example, may be transmitted, alienated and transferred by way of sale or security and may in that 
sense be used, managed and exploited for profit. It may also be stolen for purposes of criminal 
offences.22 So while Honoré's account identifies those incidents by which property rights are commonly 
recognized, it does not isolate any incident, or set of incidents, as the necessary or definitive features of 
ownership. Like Hohfeld, Honoré does not conceive of ownership as an absolute concept. 
An approach that stands in stark contrast to those of Hohfeld's and Honoré's is found in the works of 
James Penner. According to Penner, the analyses of Hohfeld and Honoré fail to produce a workable 
distinction between property and contract rights because both approaches view property as a set of 
relations between persons with no reference to the ‘thing’—the subject matter of the property right. 
Perceiving this to be the fundamental flaw of modern jurisprudence on property, Penner argues that the 
significance of property as a legal norm can only be preserved by reverting to the understanding of 
property as a ‘right to a thing’.23 For Penner, property and contract are intrinsically dissimilar because 
they protect different interests. The interest that underpins property is the interest we have in using or 
dealing with things. Practically, this right to use can only be fully vindicated if it is accompanied by the 
right to exclude others from using the same. ‘Use’ and ‘exclusion’ are therefore two sides of the same 
coin: ‘use serves a justificatory role for the right, while exclusion is seen as the formal essence of the 
right’.24 Thus, ‘the right to property is a right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the 
interest we have in the use of things’.25 Contracts, on the other hand, are concerned with forming 
cooperative relationships through bargains.26 Unlike property, which relates to ‘things’,27 a contractual 
right derives its content from its holder's personality.28 
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How, then, is a ‘thing’ to be identified? The key lies in the concept of ‘separability’. Something is 
separable, and capable of being the object of property if it is only contingently associated with the 
person who owns it. If I own a bicycle, the bicycle is only contingently mine because it is unnecessary 
for me to own one. It is the same bicycle even if it is owned by someone else. But one's talents, skill or 
labour, being inextricably bound to one's personality or identity, cannot be understood as ‘things’. 
Separability is not the same as transferability or alienability. It is the logically anterior concept: it is 
because something is separable and distinct from the person who holds it that it is regarded as 
transferable or alienable.29 The test for separability, Penner suggests, is whether ‘a different person who 
takes on the relationship to the thing [would] stand in essentially the same position as the first person’.30 
Built on the conventional paradigms of property (such as land) and non-property (such as a contract for 
service), Penner's analysis is, unsurprisingly, an adequate explanation of the difference between these 
phenomena. Much more subtlety is, however, required in explaining the ‘hybrid’ forms of property such 
as choses in action. Penner conceives of choses in action such as shares, bank balances and debts as 
holdings in respect of a piece of the total worth of a company, money in the bank or the debtor's total 
wealth. Distinguishing between the right (or holding) and its value, Penner argues that the personality 
of the one against whom the right is held is only relevant to the value—that is, in determining the worth 
of the right or holding—but not the right itself. This allows ‘the right itself to appear as if it reaches 
right through the debtor or the bank or the company to the property it legally holds’.31 So stripped of its 
personality, the right is separable as a ‘thing’. In this way, a chose in action can be regarded as property 
by reason of its ‘relative “personality poverty” in relation to other rights in personam’.32 But in 
attempting to reify choses in action, Penner ultimately disproves the very distinction he had 
painstakingly constructed. If the chose in action is a right to a portion of the counterparty's worth (or 
wealth, or wherewithal), and such worth is intimately bound up with the party's personality, then the 
personality does define the right. A share in a company that is a going concern is not merely a claim on 
the residual assets after the discharge of its liabilities to creditors. It is also a claim on the company that 
derives its personality from, amongst others, its management, track record, goodwill, prospects and the 
nature of its business. Further, a share entitles its holder to participate in the company's affairs and 
protection under relevant statutory provisions. Far from being severed from the company's personality, 
the entire relationship is suffused with the company's personality. By the same token, even a simple 
debt relation is not devoid of personality. Accepting that a debt relationship is centrally concerned with 
the exchange of economic value, such value can only be determined by reference to the identity of the 
debtor. The state of the debtor's wherewithal necessarily encapsulates her identity—her effort, 
capabilities and resources. To insist that such relationship is impersonal seems, at best, contrived. 
Penner's analysis is provocative as a comprehensive and sustained effort to defend property as a distinct 
legal norm. However, while impersonality may indeed characterize many forms of traditional property, 
it is a much less cogent feature of property rights in the marginal cases. It is doubtful, therefore, if the 
criterion of impersonality is in fact useful in characterizing novel rights arising from industrial and 
financial innovation. Ironically, by attempting to redeem property, Penner may have affirmed what he 
has set out to disavow—Hohfeld's conception of in rem and in personam rights as qualitatively 
indistinct. Property rules are essentially rights to persons (and not things) for the simple reason that 
legal rules are ultimately concerned with the behaviour of persons.33 
Hohfeld's depiction of in rem or property rights is initially disconcerting because it defies the common 
understanding of property as a ‘thing’, ie a concept capable of precise definition by reference to some 
inherent and unique quality. But that is precisely why it is significant. By exposing the fallacy in the 
conception of property as a reified object, Hohfeld's analysis suggests, instead, that the distinguishing 
criteria between in rem and in personam rights are external rather than internal to the right.34 
Fundamentally, property rules are the result of a legal culture's commitment to the protection of wealth 
and resources.35 As such, property is an ‘essentially-contested concept’,36 moulded in accordance with 
the social norms and ideology of a particular society. The designation of a resource as ‘property’ is 
therefore a conclusion, not a justification, derived from the application of particular normative or policy 
considerations.37 Quite often, however, such normative decisions are masked in the language of 
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property. So, in Boardman v Phipps,38 for example, it was held that a trustee may not exploit to his own 
advantage confidential information learnt in the course of administering a trust because such 
information constitutes ‘trust property’. Likewise, in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd,39 a bank deposit 
being a chose in action was held to be a ‘species of property’ which, when stolen, entitled the owner 
thereof to trace (at common law) into the products obtained by the use of the stolen money.40 And in 
Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid,41 an employee who had accepted a bribe was found to have 
held the same on constructive trust for his employer because the bribe was deemed, in equity, to be the 
‘property’ of the latter.42 In all these instances, property notions were injected to supply the normative 
force that was otherwise unarticulated.43 Such normative force rests, in turn, on the conventional but 
misconceived understanding of property as an apolitical, pre-existing and inviolable right.44 This form 
of reasoning reinforces the fiction that the role of the courts is confined to that of ‘discovering’ property. 
In reality, of course, a court creates property each time it accords ‘proprietary’ protection to a resource.45 
Once it is recognized that property is a social construct rather than a transcendental phenomenon, it 
must become apparent that the concept is limited in both its content as well as analytical value. 
Ultimately, the decision to confer proprietary protection on a particular resource or interest calls for a 
thorough and explicit examination of the nature of the interest as well as the relevant policy 
considerations. By itself, property talk is neither a sufficient nor a useful substitute. But that is not to 
say that property is completely devoid of content. As a legal phenomenon, property has and will 
continue to be of critical importance in the realm of private law in denoting a sphere of individual liberty 
within which a legal person's access to resources is protected against the claims of the state and of other 
citizens.46 When a property analogy is invoked, it is an attempt to adjust the boundaries of this sphere. 
While there exists no precise criterion for deciding where the boundary line ought to fall, the process is 
nevertheless constrained by broad and threshold conditions elucidated by the particular technique by 
which property secures liberty. Gray locates these ‘irreducible elements’ in the concept 
‘excludability’.47 ‘A resource is “excludable” only if it is feasible for a legal person to exercise 
regulatory control over the access of strangers to the various benefits inherent in the resource.’48 It is 
not excludable if it is physically impossible to control access to the resource,49 or if there exist legal50 
or moral51 reasons that inhibit such control. Property, according to Gray, is thus essentially concerned 
with control over access:  
Property is a power-relation constituted by the state's endorsement of private claims to regulate the 
access of strangers to the benefits of particular resources. If, in respect of a given claimant and a given 
resource, the exercise of such regulatory control is physically impracticable or legally abortive or 
morally or socially undesirable, we say that such a claimant can assert no “property” in that resource 
and for that matter can lose no “property”.52 
That being the case, the value of property analogies lies in directing the court's attention to the nature 
and degree of control which a claimant seeks to assert over a particular interest or resource, as well as 
the practical, legal and moral justifications for the same. 
Given this broad and fluid conception of property, the apprehension of contract and property as 
conceptual opposites is plainly indefensible. Like property, contract does in some circumstances vest a 
measure of exclusive control in its holder. To that extent contractual rights may quite appropriately be 
described as ‘property’. And it is in that vein that the references to property were made in OBG v Allan. 
Unfortunately, however, the use of property analogies without overt recognition of the normative forces 
at work tends to obfuscate rather than illuminate. Moreover, such analogies are commonly underpinned 
by the misconception of property as an integral concept, as a result of which a conclusion as to the 
‘propertiness’ of a resource in one context is taken to imply general exclusivity in all other contexts. 





3. Inducing Breach of Contract 
Although the tort in Lumley v Gye has stood for well over a century, its precise rationale remains 
obscure.53 In OBG v Allan, the House of Lords offered at least two justifications for the tort. First, that 
protection against strangers is warranted because contracts are a species of property.54 Secondly, a 
person is liable for inducing another's breach of contract because by such inducement, the inducer has 
joined in the contract breaker's act. For this reason, the tort is a form of accessory liability; for ‘[if] there 
is no primary liability, there can be no accessory liability.’55 Liability is thus founded on the proof of 
an actionable wrong, ie a breach of contract.56 This basis of liability was also likened to that of joint 
tortfeasance57 because a defendant would only be liable if he has actively participated in the primary 
wrongdoing. Mere facilitation is insufficient.58 
Although this article is primarily concerned with the former justification, it is necessary briefly to 
evaluate the latter so as to discern the true rationale of the tort. 
A. Joint and Accessory Liability 
In OBG v Allan, one of their Lordships’ chief concerns was to distinguish the tort of inducing breach 
of contract from unlawful interference with trade so as to avert the expansion of either tort in a way that 
would unduly impinge on the ordinary conduct of commercial life. To this end, the insistence on there 
being a breach of contract, some active participation on the part of the tortfeasor and a restrictive 
definition of the requisite state of mind were identified to limit the ambit of the inducement tort. These 
effectively put to an end any attempt to extend Lumley v Gye to interferences that merely prevent or 
hinder another from performing his contract without occasioning any breach of contract.59 Insisting on 
a stricter causal nexus (ie the inducer's active participation) exposes the fallacy in the distinction 
between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ interferences,60 and redirects attention to the more pertinent distinction 
between the inducement and unlawful interference tort. In addition, liability for the tort is predicated on 
the inducer's state of mind. The inducer must have known that his conduct would result in the 
contracting party's breach, in the sense that the breach is either an end in itself or a means to a desired 
end. That a breach is foreseeable would not suffice.61 
That inducing breach of contract could be understood as a form of joint tortfeasance is supported by a 
line of authoritative decisions.62 On closer analysis, however, the attempt to weave a common thread 
through joint torts and inducing breach of contract produces an oddity. When two or more persons are 
jointly liable in tort, only one tort is committed.63 Similarly, if one party procures another to commit a 
tort, such as trespass, the latter's act is attributed to the former and both are the principal wrongdoers of 
the same tort. The act of procurement is not a separate tort.64 Since joint tortfeasors are really liable as 
principals rather than accessories, joint tort liability is not, strictly speaking, a true form of accessory or 
secondary liability.65 Applying this understanding of joint liability to the tort of inducing breach of 
contract, the conceptual incongruence becomes apparent.66 Since a contractual obligation is unique to a 
contracting party, it cannot be breached by a non-contracting party. A ‘joint principal’ of another's 
contractual breach is manifestly a conceptual impossibility.67 
It is possible, of course, that their Lordships in OBG did not intend a strict analogy between joint 
tortfeasance and inducing breach of contract, so that both torts though not identical are nevertheless 
understood as particular instances of the broader principle that one who procures another to commit a 
civil wrong is liable for that wrong. Support for this approach is found in the work of Philip Sales,68 
who argues that a number of areas in English civil law impose secondary liability on defendants on the 
premise of this general principle. Secondary liability of this order arises by analogy with criminal 
accessory liability and comprises two main principles.69 The first is that a person is liable if he induces 
or procures another to commit a civil wrong. The second imposes liability on those who assist in the 
commission of a civil wrong.70 
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Sales may broadly be understood as saying that there exists a cluster of instances which are unified by 
the fact that they impose liability on a person who is in some way involved in another's wrong. But any 
attempt to extrapolate specific guidance from this broad observation proves to be unprofitable.71 For a 
start, the analogy with secondary liability for crime has been rejected as unhelpful because criminal law 
has historically developed to address different policy concerns.72 A person may be criminally guilty of 
inciting another to commit a crime even if no crime is ultimately committed, but no equivalent of such 
inchoate offences exists in civil law. And while criminal law sanctions the aiding and abetting of a 
crime, the mere assistance or facilitation of another's tort is not a sufficient cause for imposing 
secondary liability for the tort.73 In the context of equity, even though analogies have been drawn 
between inducing breach of contract and knowing assistance with a breach of trust,74 any suggestion to 
homogenize their constituent elements has not been seriously pursued. On the contrary, these causes of 
action continue to develop apart. Thus, a person who has assisted with a breach of trust is only liable if 
he is aware that his conduct is dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest people,75 but neither 
assistance nor subjective dishonesty is a constituent of joint tortfeasance or procuring contractual 
breach. More controversially, the House of Lords has recently rejected the popular view that conspiracy 
by unlawful means is a form of secondary liability, holding that the gist of the tort lies in the fact of 
combination rather than actionable wrongdoing.76 This development usefully cautions against too 
zealous an attempt to unify disparate strands of private law. Ultimately, each rule can only be 
convincingly rationalized by reference to the distinct policy concerns underpinning the same. 
To summarize, inducing breach of contract cannot be analysed as a form of joint liability because a 
breach of contract cannot, by its intrinsic nature, be committed by a non-contracting party. It may 
loosely be described as a form of secondary or accessory liability since there exists a nexus between the 
act of persuasion and the contractual breach, but this descriptor by itself neither justifies nor elucidates 
the tort. Because the tort is essentially concerned with protecting contractual interests, or a particular 
aspect of such interests, its rationale can ultimately only be uncovered by examining the nature of this 
protected interest. 
B. Contract as Promise 
In an illuminating and persuasive account,77 Andrew Simester and Winnie Chan argued that the 
contractual promise is at the heart of the inducement tort. In their reasoning, Simester and Chan relied 
on Joseph Raz's conception of promise-making as an act that creates an obligation of intrinsic worth.78 
In Raz's analysis, contractual promises are enforceable because the practice of promising creates a 
‘special bond’ between the promisor and the promisee that is regarded as valuable. Such a bond obliges 
the former to regard the claim of the latter as one having a ‘peremptory force’, ie that the promisor must 
disregard reasons that may conflict with his promise to perform.79 That means, in the words of Simester 
and Chan, that the promise ‘creates a reason that did not previously exist, obliging the promisor to treat 
the promisee as special.’80 A valid contract thus produces two distinct legal and moral entitlements: ‘the 
right to pre-emptive status in the promisor's reasoning, and the right to performance’.81 
Differentiating these two entitlements is critical to Simester and Chan's thesis because it helps to explain 
the distinct conceptual bases of the inducement tort and the unlawful means tort. A third party who 
persuades a promisor not to perform his contractual undertaking undermines ‘the very status of that 
undertaking as a reason-generating promise’.82 The wrong lies in attacking the peremptory nature of the 
promisor's promise. In contrast, a party's promise is not similarly affected in the paradigm case of 
unlawful interference, where the third party prevents performance by the use of unlawful force. In this 
context, the third party's conduct is not aimed at subverting the promisor's promise but to inflict harm 
on the promisee generally. Liability is thus founded on the third party's intention to harm the promisee 
through the use of unlawful means. 
By teasing apart the distinct interests generated by a contractual promise, Simester and Chan's analysis 
departs from traditional justifications that assume the protected interest is a monolithic concept of 
contracted performance or benefit. The latter generally leads to an expansive view of the tort. If the tort 
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is understood as protecting performance generally, then it will apply whenever a third party had by 
intentional conduct harmed the promised performance, rendering irrelevant the precise mode by which 
harm is inflicted. In contrast, Simester and Chan's analysis produces a better fit with the inducement 
tort as delineated by the House of Lords in OBG v Allan. It explains, in particular, why direct 
inducement or persuasion is an essential element of the tort. Because the tort seeks to uphold the 
peremptory status of the promise, liability is only triggered if the third party's conduct is aimed at 
perverting the promisor's attitude towards his own promise, ie in ceasing to regard the same as bearing 
peremptory status. 
C. ‘Property’ in Promises 
If Simester and Chan are right, then the specific interest that the inducement tort protects is that of the 
promisee's superior access to the promisor's promise. The peremptory nature of the promise provides 
both legal and moral grounds for excluding the third party's interference. Given this exclusive access 
(vis-à-vis third parties) to the peremptory status of the promisor's promise, can the promisee's interest 
not be characterized as a form of ‘property’? Such a proposition may appear, at first sight, ludicrous. 
To recall, it has been observed that it is an irreducible feature of a proprietary resource that it must be 
‘excludable’, ie it must be feasible to regulate the access of strangers to the benefit inherent in such 
resource.83 To say that a promisee has ‘property’ in the peremptory nature of the promise will thus 
suggest that the promisee is able to restrict another's access to that aspect of the promise which, in 
essence, relates to the promisor's state of mind. Seen in this light, the proposition is both physically 
impossible and morally objectionable. As Simester and Chan observed in a related context,84 
When it comes to other persons’ attitudes, emotions, intentions, and the like, ownership analogies are 
entirely misplaced; indeed, they are inconsistent with the principles of individual autonomy that are the 
cornerstones of any liberal society. 
But this is not an irrefutable objection. Its essential supposition is that notions such as ‘property’ and 
‘ownership’ imply absolute control and thus the assertion of such control over a person's reasoning 
process is both senseless and repugnant. That is, as we have seen,85 a misconception because property 
and ownership are relative rather than absolute concepts, and thus the ability to exclude access is itself 
a relative rather than an absolute phenomenon. It is true, of course, that a promisee can in no way 
prohibit a promisor from contemplating a contractual breach.86 But the inducement tort allows her to 
seek an injunction and/or damages on proof of a causal link between the breach of the contract and the 
third party's active inducement or persuasion. To that extent, the promisee is able to restrict, vis-à-vis 
third parties, access to the peremptory status of the promise and, to that extent, the law recognizes that 
her interest is an ‘excludable’ resource. 
So defined, this property interest is really rather limited. As a relative concept, it does not claim that a 
contractual right is a ‘thing’ that is a superior entitlement in all contexts. Thus, the fact that contracts 
are protected from a third party's inducement may not by itself warrant the application of other 
‘proprietary’ consequences, such as the availability of injunctive remedies upon breach, or the conferral 
of priority in insolvency. In each context, the nature of the protected interest and its ‘excludability’ has 
to be examined afresh. 
This approach may be contrasted with other attempts to justify the inducement tort by analogy, such as 
that made by Richard Epstein.87 In his analysis, Epstein suggests that the promised performance could 
be regarded as property owned by the promisee, and a third party who has notice or knowledge of the 
anterior contract ‘appropriates’ this property from the promisee when he procures the promisor's breach. 
By analogizing closely with the tort of conversion, Epstein sees the gist of the tort as lying in the 
inducer's mere receipt of property.88 Seen in this light, ‘property’ is a stable and absolute notion 
comprising the promised performance. But this account has the effect of dramatically enlarging the 
scope of the tort. If the tort is indeed concerned with protecting performance generally, then liability 
should attach whenever a third party's conduct has the effect of inhibiting performance. It will not be 
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necessary to establish inducement or even intention. A sufficient causal link between the third party's 
conduct and the fact of non-performance will suffice. This, however, is precisely the result that the 
House of Lords painstakingly sought to avoid in OBG v Allan. As it is presently circumscribed, the tort 
confers (vis-à-vis the third party) exclusivity on the interest in the promise, not the performance. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that Lord Hoffmann's depiction89 of contracts as a species of 
property requiring special protection ought to be understood in its proper context. Such ‘property’ as 
exists should be confined to the status of the promise. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the same 
interest is at stake in other contexts. As we shall see, the tort of conversion—if it could apply to contract 
rights at all—is concerned with protecting an entirely different facet of contractual interests. 
4. Conversion 
Despite its antiquated origin, the tort of conversion is not easily understood and difficult to define 
because of the infinite varieties of circumstances in which it may occur.90 Broadly, it is said to guard 
against the ‘unauthorised dealing with the claimant's chattel so as to question or deny his title to it.’91 
Whilst the origin of the tort lies in the protection of personal property, its protection has since been 
extended to ‘documentary intangibles’92 such as cheques, negotiable instruments, shares, guarantees, 
insurance policies and bonds. Liability for conversion is, in general, strict. The defendant's ignorance 
of the claimant's rights is not usually a defence to a conversion claim. The rationale is that ‘[at] common 
law, one's duty to one's neighbour who is the owner, or entitled to possession, of any goods is to refrain 
from doing any voluntary act in relation to his goods which is a usurpation of his proprietary or 
possessory rights in them.’93 Interestingly, although the extension of conversion liability to 
documentary intangibles has for some time been described as ‘odd’94 and fictional,95 no serious attempt 
has been made to rationalize this phenomenon until OBG v Allan. 
A. OBG v Allan 
The claims in OBG v Allan arose in respect of the unauthorized dealings of the defendants, who were 
receivers appointed over the claimant's (a civil engineering company) business and assets. Acting in 
good faith, the defendants assumed control of the company, took steps to wind down its business, sold 
its land and other tangible assets, terminated its outstanding contracts with subcontractors, and 
negotiated a settlement with one of its largest customers in respect of outstanding claims. It turned out, 
however, that the defendants’ appointment as receivers was in fact invalid. The claimant through its 
liquidator then brought proceedings against the receivers claiming, inter alia, that in acting without 
authority, the receivers had trespassed, converted and wrongfully interfered with its business, assets and 
undertakings. No one disputed that the receivers were liable for converting the claimant's tangible assets 
including plant, machinery and chattels, but the same could not be said of their unauthorized dealings 
with the claimant's debts and contracts. The submission that the tort of conversion applied to contract 
rights was rejected at trial, and subsequently by the Court of Appeal96 as well as by a majority of the 
Law Lords. The resulting conundrum is plain. The receivers dealt unlawfully with both tangible and 
intangible assets, so why was liability confined to the former? 
Most of the reasons are contained in the speech of Lord Hoffmann, with whom Lord Walker and Lord 
Brown concurred. The first is historical.97 The tort originated as a means of protecting chattels and has 
largely continued to develop as such. Even when the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 was 
enacted, Parliament had not seen fit to alter this narrow object.98 Secondly, the damages that OBG 
claimed to have arisen from the alleged conversion of its contracts were, in Lord Hoffmann's view, a 
form of pure economic loss. Extending the conversion tort—a form of strict liability—to protect such 
interests is thus inconsistent with English law's characteristically restrictive attitude towards the 
recovery of pure economic loss.99 Thirdly, while it is well-established that liability may arise for 
conversion of documentary choses in action, the application of the tort to such instruments is better seen 
as an anomaly and is thus a weak base on which to expand the tort.100 Alternatively, the divergent 
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treatment of documentary and general choses in action distinction may, as suggested by Lord Brown, 
be justified by the fact that the former has ‘real and ascertainable value’ but the latter does not.101 
For the dissenting Law Lords (Lord Nicholls and Baroness Hale), however, the distinction between 
tangible (chattels) and intangible (contracts) rights is indefensible. Having recognized that a chose in 
action comprised in a document may be converted, English law must be taken to have accepted that 
both tangible and intangible rights may be misappropriated and merit equal protection.102 No rational 
basis exists for distinguishing between contract rights embodied in a document and those that are not. 
In all cases, the underlying interest protected by the law is the contractual interest, and not the 
document.103 Once contract rights are regarded as ‘property’, the law must logically supply ‘proprietary’ 
remedies to protect them.104 
Embedded in their Lordships’ reasoning are diverse conceptions of ‘property’. The strict conception of 
property as a ‘thing’ is most conspicuous in Lord Hoffmann's speech. His Lordship's distinction 
between chattels and choses in action (which results only in ‘pure economic loss’) reflects the 
understanding of property as a ‘thing’, or more specifically, as physical things. In a similar vein, Lord 
Brown deplored the claimant's attempt to sever the link between the tort of conversion and ‘the wrongful 
taking of physical possession of property.’105 
Baroness Hale's reasoning hints, at first sight, at comprehending property as ‘things’ but, on closer 
inspection, more closely resembles Honoré's analysis of ownership as a manifestation of a group of 
legal incidents.106 Noting that the ‘property’ to which conversion applies has evolved over time, her 
Ladyship observed that ‘the essential feature of property is that it has an existence independent of a 
particular person: it can be bought and sold, given and received, bequeathed and inherited, pledged or 
seized to secure debts, acquired (in the olden days) by a husband on marrying its owner.’107 In a later 
passage,108 her Ladyship distinguished between choses in action that are ‘of a purely personal kind’ and 
those that enjoy ‘the characteristics of property’, contending that the latter group of rights ought, 
whether or not embodied in a document, to be regarded as capable of being converted. Taken together, 
her Ladyship appears to suggest that property, in the nature of an impersonal right, may be identified 
by reference to ‘standard’ features such as transferability and transmissibility. While this conception 
does broadly reflect the conventional understanding of property,109 the suggestion that property may be 
identified by particular definitive traits such as assignability is, with respect, unlikely to be helpful. As 
Gray has observed,110 a right is not property because it is assignable. Rather, it is assignable only 
because it is property. In other words, the law confers property status when it permits the transfer of a 
right or interest. Overall, Baroness Hale appears to advocate a fairly broad approach to ‘property’. In 
OBG v Allan, the allegedly converted contracts were engineering contracts that involved the provision 
of services the value of which could not be precisely ascertained. Nevertheless, her Ladyship was 
prepared to hold that such contracts could be converted. This would suggest that most commercial 
contracts could properly be regarded as a species of ‘impersonal’ rights. 
Since conversion is concerned with the protection of property, focusing on ‘property’ is clearly right. 
But ‘property’ cannot be understood in vacuo. As with inducing breach of contract, property talk is only 
meaningful if it is recognized that the term is itself a relative concept that derives its content from its 
context. To different degrees, both the majority and dissenting Law Lords appear to have assumed that 
property is either an absolute concept, or a concept with distinct features. As explained, such 
assumptions have a tendency to obscure more cogent analyses. In the final analysis, the parameters of 
the tort can only be determined by analysing the nature of the legal interests which it aims to protect. 
B. Protection of Ownership and Control 
At law, the tort of conversion is said to protect a person's possessory interests in chattels. The right to 
bring an action for conversion is not confined to the true owner of a chattel, but extends to any person 
who has possession, or an immediate right of possession to the same. Legal possession is established if 
a person has physical custody and control of property (‘factual possession’) and the intention to exercise 
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such custody and control for his own benefit (‘intention to possess’).111 The reason for according 
possession special protection is that a person who has possession of a chattel is presumed, as against 
the wrongdoer, to have ownership of the chattel because ‘possession in fact is the visible exercise of 
ownership, the fact of possession, so long as it is not otherwise explained, tends to show that the 
possessor is the owner’.112 Possession is thus a term of art, a legal conclusion drawn in respect of the 
observable exercise of control over a physical matter. By the same token, the possession of an intangible 
is generally thought to be impossible.113 The majority Law Lords’ narrow conception of ‘property’ in 
OBG v Allan affirms this traditional position. 
But in keeping faith with precedent, the majority's conclusion accentuates a growing gap in the 
protection of valuable personal resources. By confining the tort of conversion to tangible property, it 
leaves unaddressed the vulnerability of intangible rights which, as the decision in OBG v Allan amply 
demonstrates, are also susceptible to usurpation by unauthorized persons. The suggestion to extend the 
tort of conversion to safeguard such interests is therefore not wholly without merit. Fundamentally, the 
tort may be understood as an instantiation of the broader principle of protecting a person's ownership, 
or (on Gray's analysis114) control of access to a valued resource. In the past, the contours of the tort have 
been demarcated by reference to the characteristics of tangible property because such were the valuables 
of those times. In that context, possession has acquired a high degree of protection because physical 
control of tangible property was the best proxy of ownership or exclusive control. But, as social 
perceptions of value evolve, so should the law. If it is accepted that the gist of the tort lies in protecting 
exclusive control over the use of valuable resources generally, the precise manifestation of control must 
surely be context-dependent. There is, in principle, no reason for insisting on physical control when the 
relevant resource does not exist in physical form.115 
In determining whether a particular resource may be protected by the tort of conversion, the starting 
point is to examine whether the protected interest is, by its nature, one that is ‘excludable’.116 Applied 
to contractual rights, the analysis is surprisingly straightforward. Except where the same has been 
delegated or assigned, a contracting party's rights to deal with the contract are, by definition, exclusive 
to him. Of course, there are instances where the precise form of control has been modified by law and 
practice. Documentary intangibles, for example, may vest control in the holder of the relevant document 
or instrument representing the chose in action, but that does not alter the fact that the underlying chose 
in action is intrinsically amenable to exclusive dominion.117 On the facts of OBG v Allan, for instance, 
it cannot be doubted that the claimant ought, in the absence of any unauthorized interference, to have 
the sole and exclusive right to determine the conduct and discharge of its contracts. Thus on both factual 
and moral grounds, there appears to be no reason why a party's dominion over his contract rights ought 
not to be shielded against the obtrusion of strangers. Put another way, there is prima facie no reason 
why contract rights could not constitute convertible ‘property’. 
C. Control Distinguished from Benefit 
Expanding the tort to protect intangibles would, as the majority Law Lords observed in OBG v Allan,118 
necessitate the re-conception of its elements. It would require all ideas premised on the physical world—
such as possession and the detailed rules on the acts that constitute conversion119—to be re-examined 
and possibly reconstructed in their application to intangibles. Lord Walker denounced this as ‘too 
drastic’ a change.120 Evidently, such concern as regards the breadth of the suggested reform is not 
confined to the internal reworking of the tort, but extends also to the complexities involved in 
rationalizing the expanded tort within the general structure of civil liability. Under the general structure, 
tort law accords different degrees of protection to property and other economic interests. Liability for 
violating property rights is generally strict, but liability for pure economic loss is fault-based. Having 
characterized the alleged conversion of the claimant's debts and contracts as a claim for pure economic 
loss, imposing liability on the basis of a ‘property’ framework seemed—to the majority Law Lords—
wholly incongruous. For this reason, Lord Hoffmann warned against ‘making fundamental changes to 
the law of tort in order to provide remedies which, if they are to exist at all, are properly the function of 
other parts of the law’.121 
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The foregoing analysis is, however, premised on the assumption that the contractual interest—as a form 
of pure financial interest—is reducible to a singular construct comprising essentially the benefit of the 
contract. With respect, such an approach is erroneous in conflating the distinct contractual interests that 
a party acquires. In OBG v Allan, the claimants did not merely allege that the receivers had caused them 
loss. The essence of their complaint was that the receivers had wrongly usurped their rightful control 
over the legal rights attached to the relevant debts and contracts. No doubt the claim crystallizes in 
financial damage, but such damage is the result, not the cause, of the alleged violation. This distinction 
between the rights to manage or control one's contractual interests, and the benefit or enjoyment of such 
interests, is palpable. Once a binding contract is formed, the contracting party acquires the power to 
decide what to do with his rights under the contract. He may choose to perform his obligations or 
otherwise discharge or terminate the contract in a manner permitted by the law. The nature of the power 
is certain and exclusive to the contracting party once it is vested in him. The contracted benefit, in 
contrast, is contingent and uncertain. Although a contracting party has an expectation to receive such a 
benefit, he does not ‘own’ the same until and unless it crystallizes upon performance. Apart from the 
counter-party's performance, other external factors may also affect its value. On that account, exclusive 
access to the contracted benefit is conceptually impossible. 
Once the element of control is isolated as the gist of the tort, its expansion to protect contractual rights 
would in practice represent only ‘a modest but principled extension’.122 Liability is not triggered by 
conduct that affects the value of the contract. Instead, it arises only in situations where control over 
contractual rights has been directly and invalidly assumed or misappropriated by the converter. Such 
situations would be rare, because contractual choses in action are, by their very nature, rarely amenable 
to such interference. Ordinarily, a third party cannot (except through the operation of law or the practice 
of deceit) acquire control over a contractual chose in action without the cooperation or assent of the 
contracting party. In the majority of cases, therefore, a claim for conversion would be met by the 
defences of acquiescence or estoppel.123 A case such as OBG v Allan is thus more likely than not the 
exception. 
The exercise of prudence in evaluating any proposed expansion of tortious liability is undoubtedly 
necessary and salutary. On the other hand, restrictions of liability have to be explicable on a principled 
and rational basis. As the facts of OBG v Allan amply demonstrate, the rapidly changing forms of 
valuable resources have placed the traditional distinction between tangibles and intangibles under 
severe strain. As the dissenting Law Lords observed,124 there is no convincing reason for imposing strict 
liability on the receivers in OBG v Allan for the loss incurred in respect of the tangible assets but not 
the intangible assets. This same awkwardness may be observed of other forms of interests. It is well-
established, for instance, that a share that is evidenced by a share certificate may be converted as the 
share is said to have merged with the certificate. However, shares that are actively traded in most 
modern economies have ceased, for most practical purposes of the ordinary shareholder, to be 
represented by any physical document. Instead, these shares are dematerialized, and the interest of the 
shareholder is reduced to that of a contractual chose in action.125 Following the decision of the House 
of Lords in OBG v Allan, a third party would be liable for unauthorized dealing with shares represented 
by share certificates, but not if he had similarly dealt with shares listed on an exchange. This would be 
a surprising result, creating, as it were, two distinct legal regimes in respect of what is essentially the 
same subject matter. 
It is true, of course, that the tort of conversion may not always be the most appropriate means of 
protecting one's exclusive access to a particular resource.126 The applicability of the tort to novel 
resources would have to be scrutinized in context. In OBG v Allan, Lord Hoffmann was evidently 
troubled by the prospect of enlarging the exposure of honest receivers to strict liability.127 But what this 
calls for is a re-examination, which only Parliament may do, of the propriety of subjecting honest 
receivers to strict liability generally. It is one thing to say that receivers should not be strictly liable for 
honest but mistaken conduct, quite another to say that there can be no liability at all for converting 




An article of this brevity cannot pretend to resolve many or even some of the intractable difficulties 
arising at the intersection of tort, contract and property. However, it does hope, if only wishfully, that 
the reader will be persuaded of at least two observations. First, in the troubled borderland of contract 
and tort, ‘property’ is an attractive and promising answer from a distance but its appeal fades as soon 
as it approaches. A satisfactory resolution resides, ultimately, in a thorough examination of the interest 
that is sought to be protected as ‘property’. Secondly, the common assumption that contractual rights 
are in all circumstances reducible to a singular interest in the promised benefit or exchange value is 
misconceived. It may be that, as between contracting parties, the promised performance or the benefit 
thereof is of utmost importance. Beyond that, however, the rights of a contracting party vis-à-vis third 
parties may warrant a different perspective. 
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